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“Sex is the queen of problems in evolutionary biology. Perhaps no
other natural phenomenon has aroused so much interest; certainly
none has sowed so much confusion.”
—Graham Bell, 1982
Abstract
We consider a recent innovative theory by Chastain et al. on the role of
sex in evolution [Chastain et al., 2014]. In short, the theory suggests that the
evolutionary process of gene recombination implements the celebrated mul-
tiplicative weights updates algorithm (MWUA). They prove that the popu-
lation dynamics induced by sexual reproduction can be precisely modeled
by genes that use MWUA as their learning strategy in a particular coordina-
tion game. The result holds in the environments of weak selection, under the
assumption that the population frequencies remain a product distribution.
We revisit the theory, eliminating both the requirement of weak selec-
tion and any assumption on the distribution of the population. Removing
the assumption of product distributions is crucial, since as we show, this as-
sumption is inconsistent with the population dynamics. We show that the
marginal allele distributions induced by the population dynamics precisely
match the marginals induced by a multiplicative weights update algorithm
in this general setting, thereby affirming and substantially generalizing these
earlier results.
We further revise the implications for convergence and utility or fitness
guarantees in coordination games. In contrast to the claim of Chastain et
al. [2014], we conclude that the sexual evolutionary dynamics does not entail
any property of the population distribution, beyond those already implied by
convergence.
1
1 Introduction
Connections between the theory of evolution, machine learning and games have
captured the imagination of researchers for decades. Evolutionary models inspired
a range of applications from genetic algorithms to the design of distributed multi-
agent systems [Goldberg and Holland, 1988; Cetnarowicz et al., 1996; Phelps et al.,
2008]. Within game theory, several solution concepts follow evolutionary pro-
cesses, and some of the most promising dynamics that lead to equilibria in games
assume that players learn the behavior of their opponents [Haigh, 1975; Valiant,
2009].
A different connection between sex, evolution and machine learning was re-
cently suggested by Chastain, Livnat, Papadimitriou and Vazirani [2014]. As they
explain, also referring to Barton and Charlesworth [1998], sexual reproduction is
costly for the individual and for the society in terms of time and energy, and often
breaks successful gene combinations. From the perspective of an individual, sex
dilutes his or her genes by only transferring half of them to each offspring. Thus
the question that arises is why sexual reproduction is so common in nature, and
why is it so successful. Chastain et al. [2014] suggest that the evolutionary process
under sexual reproduction effectively implements a celebrated no-regret learning
algorithm. The structure of their argument is as follows.
First, they restrict attention to a particular class of fitness landscape where weak
selection holds. Informally, weak selection means that the fitness difference be-
tween genotypes is bounded by a small constant, i.e., there are no extremely good
or extremely bad gene combinations.1 Second, they consider the distribution of
each gene’s alleles as a mixed strategy in a matrix-form game, where there is one
player for each gene. The game is an identical interest game, where each player
gets the same utility— thus the joint distribution of alleles corresponds to the mixed
strategy of each player, and the expected payoff of the game corresponds to the av-
erage fitness level of the population.
Chastain et al. [2014] provide a correspondence between the sexual population
dynamics and the multiplicative weights update algorithm (MWUA) [Littlestone and Warmuth,
1994; Cesa-Bianchi et al., 1997]. In particular, they establish a correspondence be-
tween strategies adopted by players in the game that adopt MWUA and the popula-
tion dynamics, under an assumption that the fitness matrix is in the weak selection
regime, and that the population dynamic retains the structure of a product distri-
bution on alleles. With this correspondence in place, these authors apply the fact
that using MWUA in a repeated game leads to diminishing regret for each player
1A gene takes on a particular form, known as allele. By a genotype, or gene combination, we
refer to a set of alleles– one for each gene. The genotype determines the properties of the creature,
and hence its fitness in a given environment.
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to conclude that the regret experienced by genes also diminishes. They interpret
this result as maximization of a property of the population distribution, namely
“the sum of the expected cumulative differential fitness over the alleles, plus the
distribution’s entropy.”
We believe that such a multiagent abstraction of the evolutionary process can
contribute much to our understanding, both of evolution and of learning algorithms.
Interestingly, the agents in this model are not the creatures in the population, nor
Dawkins’ [Dawkins, 2006] genetic properties (alleles) that compete one another,
but rather genes that share a mutual cause.
1.1 Our Contribution
We show that the main results of Chastain et al. [2014] can be substantially gen-
eralized. Specifically, we consider the two standard population dynamics (where
recombination acts before selection (RS), and vice versa (SR)), and show that each
of them precisely describes the marginal allele distribution under a variation of the
multiplicative updates algorithm that is described for correlated strategies. This
correspondence holds for any number of genes/players, any fitness matrix, any
recombination rate, and any initial population frequencies. In particular, and in
contrast to Chastain et al., we do not assume weak selection or require the popu-
lation distribution remains a product distribution (i.e., with allele probabilities that
are independent), and we allow both the SR model and the RS model.
We discuss some of the implications of this correspondence between these bi-
ological and algorithmic processes for theoretical convergence properties. Under
weak selection, the observation that the cumulative regret of every gene is bounded
follows immediately from known convergence results, both in population dynam-
ics and in game theory (see related work). We show that under the SR dynamics,
every gene still has a bounded cumulative regret, without assuming weak selection
or a product distribution.
Our analysis also uncovers what we view as one technical gap and one concep-
tual gap regarding the fine details in the original argument of Chastain et al. [2014].
We believe that due to the far reaching consequences of the theory it is important
to rectify these details. First, according to the population dynamics the population
frequencies may become highly correlated (even under weak selection), and thus
it is important to avoid the assumption on product distributions. Second, the prop-
erty that is supposedly maximized by the population dynamics is already entailed
by the convergence of the process (regardless of what equilibrium is reached). We
should therefore be careful when interpreting it as some nontrivial advantage of the
evolutionary process.
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1.2 Related Work
The multiplicative weights update algorithm (MWUA) is a general name for a
broad class of methods in which a decision maker facing uncertainty (or a player
in a repeated game), updates her strategy. While specifics vary, all variations of
MWUA increase the probability of actions that have been more successful in pre-
vious rounds. In general games, the MWUA dynamic is known to lead to dimin-
ishing regret over time [Jafari et al., 2001; Blum and Mansour, 2007; Kale, 2007;
Cesa-Bianchi et al., 2007], but does not, in general, converge to a Nash equilibrium
of the game. For some classes of games better convergence results are known; see
Section 5.2 for details.
The fundamental theorem of natural selection, which dates back to Fisher [1930],
states that the population dynamics of a single-locus diploid always increases the
average fitness of each generation, until it reaches convergence [Mulholland and Smith,
1959; Li, 1969].2 The fundamental theorem further relates the rate of increase to
the variance of fitness in the population. In the general case, for genotypes with
more than a single locus, the fundamental theorem does not hold, although con-
structing a counter example where a cycle occurs is non-trivial [Hastings, 1981;
Hofbauer and Iooss, 1984]. However, convergence of the population dynamics has
been shown to hold when the fitness landscape has some specific properties, such
as weak selection, or weak epistasis [Nagylaki et al., 1999].3
In asexual evolutionary dynamics, every descendent is an exact copy of a single
parent, with more fit parents producing more offspring (“survival of the fittest”).
Regardless of the number of loci, asexual dynamics coincides with MWUA by
a single player [Bo¨rgers and Sarin, 1997; Hopkins, 1999]. Chastain et al. [2014]
were the first to suggest that a similar correspondence can be established for sexual
population dynamics.
2 Definitions
We follow the definitions of Chastain et al. [2014] where possible. For more de-
tailed explanation of the biological terms and equations, see Bu¨rger [2011].
2Roughly, a single-locus means there is only one property that determines fitness, for example
eye color or length of tail. Multiple loci mean that fitness is determined by a combination of several
such properties. We explain what are diploids and haploids in the next section.
3Weak epistasis means that the various genes have separate, nearly-additive contribution to fit-
ness. It is incomparable to weak selection.
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wij b1 b2 p
0
ij b1 b2 y
0 p1ij b1 b2 y
0
a1 1 0.5 a1 0.1 0.15 0.25 a1 0.094 0.082 0.174
a2 1.5 1.2 a2 0.1 0.15 0.25 a2 0.158 0.170 0.328
a3 1.3 0.8 a3 0.2 0.3 0.5 a3 0.255 0.242 0.497
x0 0.4 0.6 x1 0.507 0.493
Table 1: An example of a 2-locus haploid fitness matrix, with n = 3,m = 2.
There are 6 allele combinations, or genotypes. On the left we give the fitness of
each combination 〈ai, bj〉. In the middle, we provide an initial population distribu-
tion, and on the right we provide the distribution after one update step of the SR
dynamics, for r = 0.5.
2.1 Population dynamics
A haploid is a creature that has only one copy of each gene. Each gene has several
distinct alleles. For example, a gene for eye color can have alleles for black, brown,
green or blue color. In contrast, people are diploids, and have two copies of each
gene, one from each parent.
Under asexual reproduction, an offspring inherits all of its genes from its single
parent. In the case of sexual reproduction, each parent transfers half of its genes.
Thus a haploid inherits half of its properties from one parent and half from the
other parent. To keep the presentation simple we focus on the case of a 2-locus
haploid. This means that there are two genes, denoted A and B. In the appendix
we extend the definitions and results to k-locus haploids, for k > 2. Gene A has
n possible alleles a1, . . . , an, and gene B has m possible alleles b1, . . . , bm. It is
possible that n 6= m. We denote the set {1, . . . , n} by [n]. A pair 〈ai, bj〉 of alleles
defines a genotype.
LetW = (wij)i≤n,j≤m denote a fitness matrix. The fitness valuewij ∈ R+ can
be interpreted as the expected number of offspring of a creature whose genotype is
〈ai, bj〉. We assume that the fitness matrix is fixed, and does not change throughout
evolution. See Table 1 for an example.
We denote by P t = (ptij)i≤n,j≤m the distribution of the population at time t.
The average fitness wt at time t is written as
wt = w(P t) =
∑
ij
ptijwij . (1)
For example, the populations in Table 1 have an average fitness of w(P 0) = 1.005
and w(P 1) = 1.1012. Denote by xti =
∑
j p
t
ij and ytj =
∑
i p
t
ij the marginal
frequencies at time t of alleles ai and bj , respectively. Clearly ptij = xtiytj for all
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i, j iff P t is a product distribution. In the context of population dynamics, the set of
product distributions is also called the Wright manifold. For general distributions,
Dtij = p
t
ij − x
t
iy
t
j is called the linkage disequilibrium.
The selection strength of W is the minimal s s.t. wij ∈ [1 − s, 1 + s] for all
i, j. We say that W is in the weak selection regime if s is very small, i.e., all of wij
are close to 1.
Update step In asexual reproduction, every creature of genotype 〈ai, bj〉 has in
expectation wij offspring, all of which are of genotype 〈ai, bj〉. Thus there is
only selection and no recombination, and the frequencies in the next period are
pt+1ij = p
S
ij =
wij
wt
ptij .
In sexual reproduction, every pair of creatures, say of genotypes 〈ai, bl〉 and
〈ak, bj〉 bring offspring who may belong (with equal probabilities) to genotype
〈ai, bl〉 , 〈ak, bj〉 , 〈ai, bj〉, or 〈ak, bl〉. Thus, in the next generation, a creature of
genotype 〈ai, bj〉 can be the result of combining one parent of genotype 〈ai, ?〉with
another parent of genotype 〈?, bj〉. There are two ways to infer the distribution of
the next generation, depending on whether recombination occurs before selection
or vice versa (see, e.g., [Michalakis and Slatkin, 1996]). We describe each of these
two ways next.
Selection before recombination (SR) Summing over all possible matches and
their frequencies, and normalizing, we get:
pSRij =
∑
l∈[m]
∑
k∈[n] p
t
ilwilp
t
kjwkj
(wt)2
.
In addition, the recombination rate, r ∈ [0, 1], determines the part of the
genome that is being replaced in crossover, so r = 1 means that the entire genome
is the result of recombination, whereas r = 0 means no recombination occurs, and
the offspring are genetically identical to one of their parents. Given this, population
frequencies in the next period are set as:
pt+1ij = rp
SR
ij + (1− r)p
S
ij. (2)
Recombination before selection (RS) With only recombination, the frequency
of the genotype 〈ai, bj〉 is the product of the respective probabilities in the previous
generation, i.e., pRij = xtiytj . When recombination occurs before selection, we have
(before normalization):
pRSij = wijp
R
ij = wijx
t
iy
t
j.
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Taking into account the recombination rate and normalization, we get,
pt+1ij =
1
wR
(rpRSij + (1− r)p
S
ij) =
1
wR
wij(p
t
ij − rD
t
ij), (3)
where wR =
∑
ij wij(p
t
ij − rD
t
ij), and Dtij is the linkage disequilibrium at time t.
For an example of change in population frequencies, see Tables 1-4. We say
that P t is a stable state under a particular dynamics, if P t+1 = P t.
2.2 Identical interest games
An identical interest game of two players is defined by a payoff matrix G, where
gij is the payoff of each player if the first plays action i, and the second plays
action j. A mixed strategy of a player is an independent distribution over her
actions. The mixed strategies x,y are a Nash equilibrium if no player can switch
to a strategy that has a strictly higher expected payoff. That is, if for any action
i′ ∈ [n],
∑
j yjgi′j ≤
∑
i
∑
j xiyigij , and similarly for any j′ ∈ [m].
Every fitness matrix W induces an identical interest game, where gij = wij .
This is a game where each of the two genes selects an allele as an action (or a
distribution over alleles, as a mixed strategy). A matrix of population frequencies
P can be thought of as correlated strategies for the players. The expected payoff
of each player under these strategies is w(P ). Given a distribution P , G|P is the
subgame of G induced by the support of P . That is, the subgame where action i is
allowed iff pij > 0 for some j, and likewise for action j.
2.3 Multiplicative updates algorithms
Suppose that two players play a game G (not necessarily identical interest) re-
peatedly. Each player observes the strategy of her opponent in each turn, and
can change her own strategy accordingly.4One prominent approach is to grad-
ually put more weight (i.e., probability) on pure actions that were good in the
previous steps. Many variations of the multiplicative weights update algorithm
(MWUA) are built upon this idea, and some have been applied to strategic set-
tings [Blum and Mansour, 2007; Marden et al., 2009; Kleinberg et al., 2009]. We
follow the variation used by Chastain et al. [2014]. This variation is equivalent
to the Polynomial Weights (PW) algorithm [2007], under the assumption that the
utility of all actions (ai)i≤n is observed after each period (see Kale [2007], p. 10).
4 We assume that the player observes the full joint distribution P t, and can thus infer the (ex-
pected) utility of every action ai at time t.
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p1ij (SR) b1 b2 y1 p1ij (RS) b1 b2 y1
a1 0.088 0.085 0.174 a1 0.099 0.074 0.174
a2 0.167 0.162 0.328 a2 0.149 0.179 0.328
a3 0.252 0.245 0.497 a3 0.258 0.239 0.497
x1 0.507 0.493 x1 0.507 0.493
Table 2: Population frequencies P 1, i.e. after one update step, for r = 1. On the
left, we provide frequencies when selection occurs before recombination, whereas
on the right recombination precedes selection. The updated marginal frequencies
of alleles are the same in both cases.
p1ij (SR) b1 b2 y1 p1ij (RS) b1 b2 y1
a1 0.094 0.082 0.174 a1 0.099 0.074 0.174
a2 0.158 0.170 0.328 a2 0.149 0.179 0.328
a3 0.255 0.242 0.497 a3 0.258 0.239 0.497
x1 0.507 0.493 x1 0.507 0.493
Table 3: Population frequencies P 1 for r = 0.5. Under RS we get the same
frequencies as with r = 1 (and in fact any other value of r). This is because when
P 0 is a product distribution there is no effect of recombination under RS.
Polynomial Weights We use the term PW to distinguish this from other varia-
tions of MWUA. For any ǫ > 0, the ǫ-PW algorithm for a single decision maker
is defined as follows. Suppose first that in time t, the player uses strategy xt. Let
gti be the utility to the player when playing some pure action i ∈ [n]. Accord-
ing to the ǫ-PW algorithm, the strategy of the player in the next step would be
xt+1(i) ∼= xt(i)(1 + ǫgti), where ∼= stands for “proportional to” (we need to nor-
malize, since xt+1 has to be a valid distribution). A special case of the algorithm
is the limit case ǫ → ∞, where xt+1(i) ∼= xt(i)gti ; i.e., the probability of play-
ing an action increases proportionally to its expected performance in the previous
round. Unless specified otherwise we assume this limit case, which we refer to as
the parameter-free PW.
PW in Games The fundamental feature of the PW algorithm is that the proba-
bility of playing action ai changes proportionally to the expected utility of action
ai.
Consider 2-player game G, where gij is the utility (of both players if G is an
identical interest game) from the joint action 〈ai, bj〉. In the context of a game, we
can think of at least two different interpretations of the utility of playing ai, derived
8
p2ij (SR) b1 b2 y2 p2ij (RS) b1 b2 y2
a1 0.079 0.042 0.122 a1 0.09 0.034 0.124
a2 0.228 0.172 0.401 a2 0.203 0.195 0.398
a3 0.294 0.183 0.477 a3 0.305 0.173 0.478
x2 0.602 0.398 x2 0.598 0.402
Table 4: Population frequencies P 2, i.e. after two update steps for r = 0.5. The
marginal distributions are no longer the same, since P 1 under RS is not a product
distribution.
from the joint distribution P . For this, let ytj(ai) = P t(bj |ai), i.e., the probability
that player 2 plays bj given that player 1 plays ai, according to the distribution P t.
The two interpretations we have in mind are:
• Set gt
i
=
∑
j y
t
j(ai)gij . This is the expected utility that player 1 would
get for playing ai in round t. This definition is consistent with common
interpretation of expected utility in games (e.g., in Kale [2007], Sec. 2.3.1).
• Set gti =
∑
j y
t
jgij . This is the expected utility that player 1 will get in
the next round for playing ai if player 2 will select an action independently
according to her current marginal probabilities. Thus each agent updates
her strategy as if the strategies are independent, and ignoring any observed
correlation. This definition results in the PW algorithm used in Chastain et
al. [2014].
The above definitions require some discussion. While the traditional assump-
tion is that each player only observes a sample from the joint distribution at each
round, and updates the strategy based on the empirical distribution, strategy up-
dates can also be performed in the same way when the player observes the joint
distribution at round t, even if it is hard to imagine such a case occurs in practice.
Intuitively, under the first interpretation, the player considers correlation,
whereas under the second the player assumes independence, and then uses the
marginals to compute the expected utility. E.g suppose that players play Rock-
Paper-Scissors, and the history is 100 repetitions of the sequence [(R,P) (P,S)
(S,S)]. Then under the first interpretation the best action for agent 1 is S (since it
leads to the best expected utility); whereas under the second interpretation the best
action for agent 1 is R, since agent 2 is more likely to play S.5 Clearly, when P t is a
5We can also think of the two approaches as the two sides of Newcomb’s paradox [Nozick, 1969]:
the player observes a correlation, even though deciding on a strategy cannot change the expected
utility of each action. Thus it is not obvious whether the observed correlation should be considered
in the strategy update.
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product distribution (as in Chastain et al. [2014]) then gti = gti, and the algorithms
coincide. We can also combine the two interpretations to induce new algorithms.
We thus define the PW(α) algorithm (either Parameter-free PW(α) or ǫ-PW(α)),
where the probability of playing ai is updated according to gt,(α)i = αgti+(1−α)gti.
Exponential Weights The Hedge algorithm [Freund and Schapire, 1995, 1999]
is another variation of MWUA that is very similar to PW. The difference is that
the weight of action i in each step changes by a factor that is exponential in the
utility, rather than linear. That is, xt+1(i) ∼= xt(i)(1 + ǫ)gti . For negligible ǫ > 0,
ǫ-Hedge and ǫ-PW are essentially the same, but for large ǫ they may behave quite
differently.
3 Analysis of the SR dynamics
In this section we prove that the SR population dynamics of marginal allele fre-
quencies coincide precisely with the multiplicative updates dynamics in the corre-
sponding game. This extends Theorem 4 in Chastain et al. [2014] (SI text), in that
it holds without weak selection or the assumption of product distributions through
multiple iterations. We also generalize the proposition to hold for any number of
loci/players in Appendix A.
Proposition 1. Let W be any fitness matrix, and consider the game G where gij =
wij . Then under the SR population dynamics, for any distribution P t and any
r ∈ [0, 1], we have xt+1i =
1
wt
xtig
t
i
.
Proof. By the SR population dynamics (Eq. (2)),
xt+1i =
∑
j
pt+1ij =
∑
j
(rpSRij + (1− r)p
S
ij)
= r
∑
j
∑
l
∑
k p
t
ilwilp
t
kjwkj
(wt)2
+ (1− r)
∑
j
ptijwij
wt
= r
1
wt
∑
l
ptilwil
1
wt
∑
k
∑
j
ptkjwkj + (1− r)
∑
j
ptijwij
wt
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Then since
∑
k
∑
j p
t
kjwkj is the average fitness at time t,
xt+1i = r
1
wt
∑
j
ptijwij
1
wt
wt + (1− r)
∑
j
ptijwij
wt
= r
1
wt
∑
j
ptijwij + (1− r)
∑
j
ptijwij
wt
=
1
wt
∑
j
ptijwij =
1
wt
∑
j
xtiy
t
j(ai)wij ,
thus the recombination factor r does not play a direct role in the new marginal
under the SR dynamics. It does have an indirect role though, since it affects the
correlation, and thus the marginal distribution at the next generation t+ 2.
Theorem 4 in Chastain et al. [2014] follows as a special case when P t is a
product distribution. By repeatedly applying Proposition 1, we get the following
result, which holds for any value of r.
Corollary 1. Let W be a fitness matrix, P 0 be any distribution. Suppose that
P t+1 is attained from P t by the SR population dynamics, and that xt+1,yt+1 are
attained from P t by players using the parameter-free PW(0) algorithm in the game
G = W . Then for all t > 0 and any i, xti =
∑
j p
t
ij .
It is important to note that the marginal distributions xt,yt do not determine P t
completely. Thus the PW algorithm specifies the strategy of each player (regardless
of r), but not how these strategies are correlated.
4 Analysis of the RS dynamics
Turning to the RS population dynamics, our starting point is Lemma 3 in Chastain
et al. [2014] (SI text), which states that pt+1ij = 1wRwijxtiytj (under the assump-
tion that P t is a product distribution). We establish a similar property for general
distributions. We use the fact that for any fitness matrix W and distribution P t,
pt+1ij =
1
wR
(rwijx
t
iy
t
j + (1− r)wijp
t
ij).
This follows immediately from the definition (Eq. (3)). Recall that gt,(r)i =(
rgti + (1− r)g
t
i
)
. We derive an alternative extension of Theorem 4 in Chastain
et al. [2014] (SI text) for the RS dynamics.
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Proposition 2. Let W be any fitness matrix, and consider the game G where gij =
wij . Then under the RS population dynamics, for any distribution P t and any
r ∈ [0, 1], xt+1i =
1
wR
xtig
t,(r)
i .
Proof. By the RS population dynamics (Eq. (3)),
xt+1i =
∑
j
pt+1ij =
∑
j
1
wR
(rwijx
t
iy
t
j + (1− r)wijp
t
ij)
=
1
wR
∑
j
(rwijx
t
iy
t
j + (1− r)wijx
t
iy
t
j(ai))
=
1
wR
xti(r
∑
j
wijy
t
j + (1− r)
∑
j
wijy
t
j(ai)).
Finally, by the definitions of gti and gti,
xt+1i =
1
wR
xti
(
rgti + (1− r)g
t
i
)
=
1
wR
xtig
t,(r)
i .
In contrast to the SR dynamics, here r appears explicitly in the marginal distri-
bution xt+1.
So we get that under RS the marginal frequency of allele ai is updated ac-
cording to an expected utility that takes only part of the correlation into account.
This part is proportional to the recombination rate r. We get a similar result to
Corollary 1:
Corollary 2. Let W be a fitness matrix, P 0 be any distribution. Suppose that
P t+1 is attained from P t by the RS population dynamics, and that xt+1,yt+1 are
attained from P t by players using the parameter-free PW(r) algorithm in the game
G = W . Then for all t > 0 and any i, xti =
∑
j p
t
ij .
5 Convergence and Equilibrium
In this section, we consider implications of the general theory on the correspon-
dence between sexual population dynamics and multiplicative-weights algorithms
on convergence properties.
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5.1 Diminishing regret
In Chastain et al. [2014] (Sections 3 and 4 of the SI text), the authors apply stan-
dard properties of MWUA to show that the cumulative external regret of each gene
is bounded (Corollary 5 there). In other words, if in retrospect gene 1 would have
“played” some fixed allele ai throughout the game, the cumulative fitness (sum-
ming over all iterations) would not have been much better. This result leans only
on the properties of the algorithm, and does not require the independence of strate-
gies. Thus we will write a similar regret bound explicitly in our more general
model.
Consider any fitness matrix W whose selection strength is s. Let AF Ti =
1
T
∑T
t=1 g
t
i
(the average fitness in retrospect if allele ai had been used through-
out the game), and AF TSR = 1T
∑T
t=1 w
t (the actual average fitness under the SR
dynamics).
Corollary 3. For any T ∈ N, any s ∈ (0, 12) and all i ≤ n, AF
T
SR ≥ AF
T
i − s
2−
ln(n)/T .
Proof. Set ∆ij = wij−1s ; m(t)i =
∑
j y
t
j(ai)∆ij , and ǫ = s. Note that ∆ij and
m
(t)
i are in the range [−1, 1]. Intuitively, m
(t)
i is the expected profit of player 1
from playing action ai in the “differential game” W−1s .
Theorem 3 [Kale, 2007] states that under the ǫ-PW algorithm6
T∑
t=1
x(t)m(t) ≥
T∑
t=1
m
(t)
i − ǫ
T∑
t=1
(m
(t)
i )
2 −
ln(n)
ǫ
, (4)
where x(t)i is the probability that the decision maker chose action ai in iteration t
(thus x(t)i = xti by our notation).
The proof follows directly from the theorem. Observe that m(t)i = (gti − 1)/s,
and
x(t) ·m(t) =
∑
i
xtim
(t)
i =
∑
i
xti
∑
j
ytj(ai)∆ij
=
∑
ij
ptij
wij − 1
s
=
wt − 1
s
.
6Kale [2007] analyzes the Exponential Weights algorithm but a slight modification of the analysis
works for PW.
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Thus
AF Ti =
1
T
T∑
t=1
gt
i
=
1
T
T∑
t=1
sm
(t)
i + 1 = 1 + ǫ
1
T
T∑
t=1
m
(t)
i
AF TSR =
1
T
T∑
t=1
wt =
1
T
T∑
t=1
(1 + sm(t) · p(t))
= 1 + ǫ
1
T
T∑
t=1
m(t) · p(t). (replacing ǫ = s)
Plugging in Eq. (4),
AF TSR ≥ 1 + ǫ
1
T
(
T∑
t=1
m
(t)
i − ǫ
T∑
t=1
(m
(t)
i )
2 −
ln(n)
ǫ
)
≥ 1 + ǫ
1
T
(
T∑
t=1
m
(t)
i − ǫ
T∑
t=1
1−
ln(n)
ǫ
)
=
(
1 + ǫ
1
T
T∑
t=1
m
(t)
i
)
− ǫ2 −
1
T
ln(n)
= AF Ti − s
2 − ln(n)/T,
as required.
We highlight that the bound on the regret of each player (or gene) stated in this
result depends only on the algorithm used by the agent, and not on the strategies
of other agents. These may be independent, correlated, or even chosen in an ad-
versarial manner. For simplicity we present the proof for two players/genes. The
extension to any number of players is immediate because the theorem bounds the
regret of each agent separately.
By taking s to zero and T to infinity, we get that the average cumulative regret
AF TSR − AF
T
i tends to zero, as stated in Chastain et al. [2014] (they use a more
refined form of the inequality that contains the entropy of P t rather than lnn).
For the RS dynamics we get something similar but not quite the same. Since
g
t,(r)
i is not exactly the expected fitness at time t, we get that cumulative regret
is diminishing but not w.r.t. the actual average fitness wt. That is, the regret is
determined as if the actual expected fitness of action ai is gt,(r)i . More formally,
we get a variation of Corollary 3, where AF Ti = 1T
∑T
t=1 g
t,(r)
i and AF TRS =
1
T
∑T
t=1
∑
i x
t
ig
t,(r)
i .
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5.2 Convergence under weak selection
In normal-form games, following strategies with bounded or diminishing regret
does not, in general, guarantee convergence to a fixed point in the strategy space.7
For some classes of games though, much more is known. For example, if all play-
ers in a potential game apply the ǫ-Hedge algorithm, with a sufficiently small ǫ,
then P t converges to a Nash equilibrium [Kleinberg et al., 2009], and almost al-
ways to a pure Nash equilibrium. Similar results have been shown for concave
games [Even-Dar et al., 2009]. Since identical-interest games are both potential
games and concave games, and since for small ǫ we have that Hedge and PW are
essentially the same, these results apply to our setting. This means that under each
of RS and SR dynamics, the population converges to a stable state, for a sufficiently
low selection strength s.
This implication is not new, and has been shown independently in the evolu-
tionary biology literature. Indeed, Nagylaki et al. [1999] prove that under weak
selection, the population dynamics converges to a point distribution from any ini-
tial state (that is, to a Nash equilibrium of the subgame induced by the support of
the initial distribution). Note that under weak selection, Corollary 3 becomes triv-
ial: once in a pure Nash equilibrium (ai∗ , bj∗) (say at time t∗), the optimal action
of agent 1 is to keep playing a∗i . Thus for any t > t∗, wt = gti∗ , and the cumulative
regret does not increase further.
6 Discussion
Chastain et al. [2014] extend an interesting connection between evolution, learning,
and games from asexual reproduction (i.e., replicator dynamics) to sexual repro-
duction. The proof of Theorem 4 in Chastain et al. [2014] gives a formal meaning
to this connection. Namely, that the strategy update of each player who is using
PW(1) in the fitness game, coincides with the change in allele frequencies of the
corresponding gene (under weak selection and product distributions). This relation
is generalized in our Propositions 1 and 2, since for product distributions PW(α) is
the same for all α.
Chastain et al. [2014] also claim something stronger: that the population dy-
namics is precisely the PW dynamics. The natural formal interpretation of this
conclusion would be in the spirit of our Corollary 1, i.e., that allele distributions
and players’ strategies would coincide after any number of steps. In our case we
7It is known that the average joint distribution over all iterations converges to the set of correlated
equilibria [Blum and Mansour, 2007]. This is less relevant to us because we are interested in the
limit of P t.
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prove this for the marginal probabilities. But as we have discussed, their conclu-
sion only follows from their Theorem 4 under the assumption that P t remains a
product distribution. This is counterfactual, in that P t+1 is in general not a product
distribution (under their assumptions on the dynamic process), and thus the next
step of the PW(r) algorithm and the population dynamics would not be precisely
equivalent but only approximately equivalent. The approximation becomes less ac-
curate in each step, and in fact even under weak selection the population dynamics
may diverge from the Wright manifold, or converge to a different outcome than the
PW(r) algorithm, as we show in Appendix B. Thus while the intuition of Chatain
et al. [2014] was correct, the only way to rectify their analysis is via the more gen-
eral proof without assumptions on the selection strength (even if we accept weak
selection as biologically plausible).
What does evolution maximize? In Chastain et al. [2014] (Corollary 5 in the SI
text), it is also shown that under weak selection, “population genetics is tantamount
to each gene optimizing at generation t a quantity equal to the cumulative expected
fitness over all generations up to t,” (plus the entropy). While this is technically
correct (our Cor. 3 is a restatement of this result), we feel that an unwary reader
might reach the wrong impression, that this is a mathematical explanation of some
guarantee on the average fitness of the population. We thus emphasize that the
both [2014] and our paper establish only the property of diminishing regret, which
is already implied when P t converges to a Nash equilibrium. Players never have
regret in a Nash equilibrium, and thus the cumulative regret tends to zero after the
equilibrium is played sufficiently many times.
Thus the population dynamics cannot provide any guarantees on fitness (or on
any other property) that are not already implied by an arbitrary Nash equilibrium.
In the evolutionary context this means that the outcome can be as bad as the worst
local maximum of the fitness matrix. Also note that convergence is to a point
distribution (a pure Nash equilibrium, see Sec. 5.2), and thus its entropy is 0 and
irrelevant for the maximization claim.
Convergence without weak selection It is an open question as to what other
natural conditions are sufficient to guarantee convergence of sexual population dy-
namics. We have conducted simulations that show that convergence to a pure equi-
librium occurs w.h.p. even without weak selection, and in fact the convergence
speed increases as selection strength s (or the learning rate ǫ) grows. At the same
time, the quality of the solution/population reached seems to be the same regardless
of the selection strength/learning rate (we measured quality as the fitness of the lo-
cal maximum the dynamics converged to, normalized w.r.t. the global maximum).
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Figure 1: On the left, F (T ) is the fraction of instances that converge (reach
maxij p
t
ij > 1 − 10
−5) within at most T generations. On the right, F (Q) is
the fraction of instances that converge to an equilibrium with quality q at most
Q, where q = wt−1maxij wij−1 (the ratio between average fitness in the equilibrium that
was reached, and the optimal fitness). Results are for random fitness matrices of
size 8 × 5, where wij is sampled uniformly at random from [1 − s, 1 + s]. Note
that most instances do not converge to the optimal outcome.
Both trends are visible in Figure 1 for 8× 5 matrices, based on 1000 instances for
each plot. Similar results are obtained with other sizes of matrices.
However, it is known that the sexual population dynamics on general fitness
matrices (even on 4× 4 matrices) does not always converge, and explicit examples
have been constructed [Hastings, 1981; Akin, 1983; Hofbauer and Iooss, 1984].
By Corollaries 1 and 2, convergence of the PW algorithm to a pure Nash equi-
librium, and convergence of the population dynamics to a point distribution is the
same thing. Thus characterizing the conditions under which these dynamics con-
verge will answer two questions at once.
Conclusions We formally describe a precise connection between population dy-
namics and the multiplicative weights update algorithm. For this connection, we
adopt a version of MWUA that takes the correlation of player strategies into ac-
count, while still supporting no regret claims. More specifically, two different
variations of the Polynomial Weights subclass of MWUA each coincide with the
marginal allele distribution under the two common sexual population dynamics
(SR and RS). It is important to note that the correspondence that we establish is
between the marginal frequencies/probabilities, rather than the full joint distribu-
tion.
Notably, weak selection is not required to make these connections.Yet, it is
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known that weak selection provides an additional guarantee, which is that the dy-
namics converge to a particular population distribution [Nagylaki, 1993]. It re-
mains an open question to understand what other conditions are sufficient for con-
vergence of the PW algorithm in identical interest games. Solving this question
will also uncover more cases where the fundamental theorem of natural selection
applies.
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A Extension to Multiple Genes
A k-locus haploid has k genes, each of which is inherited from one of its two
parents. In this appendix we show how to extend our main results to a haploid with
k > 2 loci.
A.1 Notation
We consider a haploid with k loci, each with nj alleles, j ≤ k. We denote K =
[k] = {1, 2, . . . , k}, and use J to denote subsets of K .
A genotype is defined by a vector of indices iK = 〈i1, . . . , ik〉 for ij ∈ [nj].
We denote by I(J) the set of all
∏
j∈J nj partial index vectors of the form 〈ij〉j∈J .
We sometimes concatenate two or more partial genotypes: i′′J ′′ =
〈
iJ , i
′
J ′
〉
for
some iJ ∈ I(J), i
′
J ′ ∈ I(J
′). We use −J to denote K \ J .
The fitness of a genotype iK is denoted by wiK . W = (wiK )iK∈I(K) is called
the fitness landscape (which is a matrix for k = 2). Similarly, the population
frequency of genotype iK at time t is denoted by ptiK , and P
t = (pt
iK
)iK∈I(K).
The average fitness at time t is
wt =
∑
iK∈I(K)
ptiKwiK =
n1∑
i1=1
· · ·
nk∑
ik=1
ptiKwiK . (5)
Let xtj be the marginal distribution of locus j ∈ K at time t, i.e., for all ij ∈ [nj],
xtij =
∑
i−j∈I(−j)
ptij ,i−j .
In the special case of 2 loci, K = {1, 2}, and xti1 , x
t
l2
correspond to xti, ytl as used
in the main text. We also define the marginal fitness of allele ij ∈ [nj ] at time t as
the average fitness of all the population with allele ij . That is,
wtij =
∑
i−j∈I(−j)
pt(i−j |ij)wij ,i−j . (6)
A.2 RS dynamics
According to the multi-dimensional extension of pt+1
iK
,
pt+1
iK
=
1
wR
(rwiK
∏
j∈K
xtij + (1− r)wiKp
t
iK
). (7)
19
Given a game G and a joint distribution P t, let gtij =∑
i−j∈I(−j)
(
∏
j′∈I(−j) x
t
ij′
)gij ,i−j . That is, the expected utility of playing
aij when every agent j′ independently plays xtj′ .
Lemma 1. Let W be any fitness matrix, and consider the game G = W . Then
under the RS population dynamics, for any distribution P t and any r ∈ [0, 1],
xt+1ij =
1
wR
xtijg
t,(r)
ij
.
Proof.
xt+1ij =
∑
i−j∈I(−j)
pt+1ij ,i−j (By definition)
=
∑
i−j∈I(−j)
1
wR
(rwij ,i−jx
t
ij
∏
j′∈I(−|)
xtij′ + (1− r)wij ,i−jp
t
ij ,i−j
)
(By Eq. (7))
=
1
wR
xtij

r ∑
i−j∈I(−j)
wij ,i−j
∏
j′∈I(−|)
xtij′
+ (1− r)
∑
i−j∈I(−j)
wij ,i−jP
t(i−j|ij)


=
1
wR
xtij
(
rgti + (1− r)g
t
i
)
=
1
wR
xtijg
t,(r)
i .
A.3 SR dynamics
The SR population dynamics under sexual reproduction is defined as:
pt+1
iK
= r
∑
i′
K
∈I(K)
1
2k
∑
J⊆K
pt
iJ ,i
′
−J
wiJ ,i′−Jp
t
i′
J
,i−J
wi′
J
,i−J
(wt)2
+ (1− r)
wiKpiK
wt
. (8)
We can think of J as the set of genes that are inherited from the “first” parent, and
−J as the set of genes that are inherited form the “second” parent. Thus a possible
genotype of the offspring of parents with genotypes i, i′ is
〈
iJ , i
′
−J
〉
.
Lemma 2. Let W be any fitness landscape, then under the SR dynamics,
xt+1ij =
1
wt
∑
i−j∈I(−j)
ptij ,i−jwij ,i−j .
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Proof. Let J∗ = J ∪ {j}, −J∗ = K \ (J ∪ {j}).
xt+1ij =
∑
i−j∈I(−j)
pt+1ij ,i−j (By definition)
=
∑
i−j∈I(−j)
(r
∑
i′
K
∈I(K)
1
2k
∑
J⊆K
1
(wt)2
pt
iJ ,i
′
−J
wiJ ,i′−Jp
t
i′
J
,i−J
wi′
J
,i−J
+ (1− r)
ptij ,i−jwij ,i−j
wt
) (By Eq. (8))
=r
1
2k
∑
J⊆K
∑
i−j∈I(−j)
∑
i′
J
∈I(J)
i
′
−J∈I(−J)
1
(wt)2
pt
iJ ,i
′
−J
wiJ ,i′−Jp
t
i′
J
,i−J
wi′
J
,i−J
+ (1− r)
∑
i−j∈I(−j)
ptij ,i−jwij ,i−j
wt
=rC + (1− r)D
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We first analyze part C:
C =
1
2k(wt)2
∑
J⊆−{j}
∑
iJ∈I(J)
i
−J∗∈I(−J
∗)
∑
i
′
J∈I(J)
i′
−J
∈I(−J)
pt
iJ ,i
′
−J
wiJ ,i′−Jp
t
i′
J
,i−J
wi′
J
,i−J .
+
∑
J⊆−{j}
∑
iJ∈I(J)
i
−J∗∈I(−J
∗)
∑
i
′
J∗
∈I(J∗)
i
′
−J∗
∈I(−J∗)
pt
iJ∗ ,i
′
−J∗
wiJ∗ ,i′−J∗
pt
i′
J∗
,i
−J∗
wi′
J∗
,i
−J∗
=
1
2k(wt)2
∑
J⊆−{j}

 ∑
i
−J∗∈I(−J
∗)
∑
i′
J
∈I(J)
pt
i′
J
,i−J
wi′
J
,i−J
∑
iJ∈I(J)
∑
i′
−J
∈I(−J)
pt
iJ ,i
′
−J
wiJ ,i′−J
+
∑
iJ∈I(J)
∑
i′
−J∗
∈I(−J∗)
pt
iJ∗ ,i
′
−J∗
wiJ∗ ,i′−J∗
∑
i′
J∗
∈I(J∗)
∑
i
−J∗∈I(−J
∗)
pt
i′
J∗
,i
−J∗
wi′
J∗
,i
−J∗


=
1
2k(wt)2
∑
J⊆−{j}

 ∑
i
−J∗∈I(−J∗)
∑
i′
J
∈I(J)
pt
i′
J
,i−J
wi′
J
,i−J
∑
i′′
K
∈I(K)
pt
i′′
K
wi′′
K
+
∑
iJ∈I(J)
∑
i′
−J∗
∈I(−J∗)
pt
iJ∗ ,i
′
−J∗
wiJ∗ ,i′−J∗
∑
i′′
K
∈I(K)
pt
i′′
K
wi′′
K


=
1
2k(wt)2
∑
J⊆−{j}

 ∑
i
−J∗∈I(−J
∗)
∑
i′
J
∈I(J)
pt
i′
J
,i−J
wi′
J
,i−Jw
t
+
∑
iJ∈I(J)
∑
i′
−J∗
∈I(−J∗)
pt
iJ∗ ,i
′
−J∗
wiJ∗ ,i′−J∗
wt

 (By Eq. (5))
=
1
wt
1
2k
∑
J⊆−{j}

 ∑
i−j∈I(−j)
ptij ,i−jwij ,i−j +
∑
i−j∈I(−j)
ptij ,i−jwij ,i−j


=
1
wt
∑
i−j∈I(−j)
ptij ,i−jwij ,i−j
1
2k−1
∑
J⊆−{j}
1
=
1
wt
∑
i−j∈I(−j)
ptij ,i−jwij ,i−j .
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Finally,
xt+1ij = rC + (1− r)D = r
1
wt
∑
i−j∈I(−j)
ptij ,i−jwij ,i−j + (1− r)
∑
i−j∈I(−j)
ptij ,i−jwij ,i−j
wt
=
1
wt
∑
i−j∈I(−j)
ptij ,i−jwij ,i−j .
As in the case of two loci, we use the lemma to show that under the SR dynam-
ics, the marginal distribution of gene j ∈ K develops as if gene j is applying the
PW algorithm.
Given a game G and a joint distribution P t, let gt
ij
=∑
i−j∈I(−j)
P t(i−j |ij)gij ,i−j . That is, the expected utility to j of using the
pure action aij at time t.
Proposition 3. Let W be any fitness matrix, and consider the game G = W . Then
under the SR population dynamics, for any distribution P t and any r ∈ [0, 1], we
have
xt+1ij =
1
wt
xtijg
t
i
. (9)
Proof. Applying Lemma 2,
xt+1ij =
1
wt
∑
i−j∈I(−j)
ptij ,i−jP
t(i−j |ij)wij ,i−j =
1
wt
∑
i−j∈I(−j)
xtijwij ,i−j
=
1
wt
xtij
∑
i−j∈I(−j)
P t(i−j |ij)wij ,i−j =
1
wt
xtijg
t
ij
. (By Eq. (6))
The multi-dimensional extension of Corollary 1 follows in the same way from
Proposition 3.
B PW and product distributions
Consider the “uncorrelated” version of the PW algorithm, which is the one used in
[Chastain et al., 2014]:
xt+1i = x
t
i
∑
j
ytjwij = x
t
ig
t
i. (10)
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In [Chastain et al., 2014] there is no distinction between RS and SR. The for-
mal definition that they use coincides with RS (p. 1 of the SI text), whereas in an
earlier draft they used SR (p.5 in [Chastain et al., 2013]). In a private communi-
cation the authors clarified that they use SR and RS interchangeably, since under
weak selection they are very close.
Divergence from the Wright manifold Chastain et al. [2014] justify the as-
sumption that P t is a product distribution by quoting the result of Nagylaki [1993],
which states for any process (P t)t there is a “corresponding process” on the Wright
manifold, which converges to the same point. However the authors do not explain
why this corresponding process is the one they assume in their paper. To further
stress this point, we will show that the population dynamics and the PW algorithm
used in [Chastain et al., 2014] can significantly differ (we saw empirically that the
marginals also differ significantly).
Consider the 2 × 2 fitness matrix where w11 = 1 + s, and wij = 1 otherwise.
For simplicity assume first that r = 0 (thus SR and RS are the same). Suppose
that P 0 is the uniform distribution (that is on the Wright manifold). While the
population dynamics will eventually converge to p11 = 1, there is some t s.t. P t
is approximately
(
5/8 1/8
1/8 1/8
)
. Thus
∥∥P t − xt × yt∥∥
d
> 18 = Ω(1) for any
ℓd norm and regardless of the selection strength s. The gap is still large for other
small constant values of r (including when s≪ r). Thus the population dynamics
can get very far from the Wright manifold.
In the example above both processes will converge to the same outcome (p11 =
1), but at different rates.
Difference in convergence One can also construct examples that converge
to different outcomes. For example, for s = 0.01 consider W =(
1.01 1
1 1.0099603
)
. If the initial distribution is x0 = yt = (0.499, 0.501),
then the (independent) PW dynamics converges to p22 = 1, whereas for r = 0.5
the SR dynamics converges to p11 = 1. Such examples can be constructed for any
values of s > 0 and r < 1.
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